

# The Discipline of Fear. The Securitisation of International Relations Post-9/11 in Historical Perspective

Kees van der Pijl<sup>1</sup>

January 2013

This paper argues that International Relations as an academic discipline (IR) since 9/11 has become part of a growing preoccupation with 'security'. This has not always been the case, and still today there are alternative theorisations also within the mainstream of the discipline. The security perspective however was shaped by two particular junctures in which the fear of impending attack on the USA and its allies was articulated at its most dramatic. The first occurred between the original establishment of the discipline in the interwar years and the postwar siege laid on the USSR. Here the role of IR was to define as rational the assumption of a nuclear surprise attack, equating the USSR as a 'totalitarian' state similar to the Axis Powers, one of which did attack Pearl Harbour. The second can be traced back to the 1970s when the threat of Third World revolt under the banner of national liberation was re-baptised 'international terrorism' at the instigation of the Israeli Far Right and militarists in the US, thus creating a continuity between the supposed Soviet threat and post-Soviet instances of anti-Western revolt. From this the paper concludes that IR has functioned to place policy-makers and opinion leaders under a 'discipline of fear' which is insufficiently recognized, let alone challenged by IR scholars.

In the online prospectus of Long Island University's Homeland Security Management Institute<sup>2</sup>, it is claimed that 'Homeland Security is among the nation's leading growth sectors, with employment in all areas of the Homeland Security field expected to continue to rapidly expand through the coming decade. Many state and local Law Enforcement agencies also continue to shift their existing personnel and resources toward the collection and analysis of crime and terrorism intelligence, as well as toward the specialized fields of counter-terrorism planning, preparation, and response.'

Along with a range of overt surveillance and security institutions expected to be looking for qualified professionals, 'agencies within the US Intelligence community need large numbers of analysts and technical specialists as well as operatives.' This demand is not confined to public agencies either.

Indeed, virtually every sector of the American economy has a role to play in ensuring the nation's Homeland Security goals are achieved. Private sector companies, public utilities and critical infrastructure entities—especially in the transportation, health care, education, information technology, and manufacturing fields—are therefore becoming more and more involved in Homeland Security function. Corporate security personnel, and especially corporate security managers with the knowledge and skills to interface effectively with law enforcement, with the intelligence community, and with other corporations and groups involved in Homeland Security and Emergency Management,

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on a talk in the Sussex Research in Progress seminars on November 7, 2011. I submitted the written version as given here to *Alternatives* later that month and got an encouraging reply from the editor that with reviews on time, it might be published in the summer of 2012. In September and again in October I inquired whether anything had happened but got no reply. In January, after asking four members of the editorial advisory board about the possible causes of the silence and not getting a reply from them either, I withdrew the paper, again with no reply from the editor. Although I never doubted that this was a controversial paper I am still puzzled why this went the way it did. Given the topicality of the issues discussed I decided to post it on my Academia.Edu site. The paper can be freely copied and disseminated.

<sup>2</sup> Long Island University, Homeland Security Management Institute, <http://www2.southampton.liu.edu/homeland/index.html> (accessed 9 November 2010).

are in great demand. This demand is especially strong in defence industries, technology companies, and various financial services fields.

The Long Island University prospectus continues by stating that ‘the Justice and Homeland Security departments also will be seeking increasing numbers of people, especially those with foreign language expertise, to serve as intelligence officers.’ The latter sector, ‘ranked as the single largest area of need,’ was certainly boosted when ‘on November 18, 2004, President Bush issued an executive order calling for the CIA to increase staffing by 50 percent in three key areas: clandestine operators, intelligence analysts and intelligence officers proficient in “mission critical languages”.’

There is no doubt that after ‘9/11’, a host of US universities besides Long Island University have taken steps to ensure the increased supply of recruits trained in security matters. Johns Hopkins, Carnegie Mellon, the University of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania State University, among others, concluded formal agreements with the FBI under the auspices of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board. These agreements were intended (in the words of Penn State president Spanier) as a sign of the willingness of ‘leaders in higher education... to assist our nation during these challenging times’.<sup>3</sup> The University of Southern California actually created the first ‘Homeland Security Centre of Excellence’ with a grant that allowed it to recruit specialists from other leading universities,<sup>4</sup> and many other examples can be given.

In this paper I argue that the brave new world evoked by Long Island University’s Homeland Security Management Institute prospectus, which is affecting student interest and degree development in the United States and elsewhere, is not so new as it seems. The mortgaging of academia to the needs of the national security state in close association with transnational capital, has a longer history, crucially in the evolution of the discipline of International Relations (IR). Of course, as with past episodes of disciplining the universities in the name of political emergencies, such efforts always remain incomplete, not least because students and staff resist them; in doing so, they have preserved a measure of critical scholarship and academic autonomy against the encroachments of the national security state. Inevitably, however, these are marginal to the mainstream.

I will first re-examine the establishment of an IR dedicated to meeting the supposed Soviet threat after 1945, which constitutes the first transition in which fear was instrumentalised by projecting Axis aggressiveness on the USSR, whilst rationalising a permanent war economy. Secondly I address the transformation of IR by linking the 1970s Third World revolt to a supposed centre in Moscow, whilst retaining the imaginary of dictatorship bent on surprise attack and mass annihilation.

### **International Relations After Hiroshima and Nagasaki**

Today’s fear of terrorism and of weapons of mass destruction ‘in the wrong hands’ may be traced to the terror evoked by the actual use of nuclear bombs against Japanese civilian targets at the close of World War II. The atomic attacks elicited a groundswell of fear in the United States as science fiction and fact alike were

---

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Henry A. Giroux, *The University in Chains. Confronting the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex*. Boulder, Col.: Paradigm, 2007, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

distributed through all mainstream media. The US general who led the first fact-finding mission to Hiroshima testified before a Senate committee that in a nuclear attack on New York the city's skyscrapers 'would fly apart as though they themselves were bombs and someone had lighted their fuse'.<sup>5</sup> John Hersey's book-length eyewitness account of Hiroshima, first published in the *New Yorker* a year after the attack and serialised in more than fifty US newspapers, created a sensation among the wider public.

Still in August 1946, the idea to entrust the newly founded United Nations with oversight of all the world's military forces, found an echo among a substantial slice of the American public (ranging in different polls from 36 to 54 percent).<sup>6</sup> In a special postscript to his bestselling global governance proposal, *Anatomy of Peace*, journalist Emery Reves warned that to avoid 'the apocalypse of an atomic world war', only a world federation modelled on Hamilton's original design would 'prevent the next war and ...stop our drifting towards totalitarianism'.<sup>7</sup> This blend of liberal concern over enhanced state power and fear of war also resonated in George Orwell's dystopia, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, published in 1948. A more extreme version of the same ambivalence was the idea of British philosopher and future peace activist, Bertrand Russell, that world government required a preliminary atomic bombardment of the USSR since 'communism must be wiped out' first.<sup>8</sup>

That the West enjoyed the right of primogeniture, for good or bad, was never in doubt. Boyer records how a draft NBC newscast about the bomb, which spoke of 'the history of man', was changed into the claim that '*Anglo-Saxon* science has developed a new explosive 2,000 times as destructive as any known before'—a rather tenuous proposition in light of the role of refugee physicists from Europe, who in fact had hoped that the bomb's 'success' would help quell anti-Semitism in the US.<sup>9</sup> But the imagery of the mushroom cloud, later described by the pilot of the US Air Force B-29 over Hiroshima as 'boiling upward like something terribly alive', and the knowledge that more than 200,000 civilians had been incinerated in what he would depict as a 'turbulent mass of smoke that had the appearance of bubbling tar',<sup>10</sup> only to be followed by a second bomb on Nagasaki the same week, did not waft over easily. A Dutch psychologist traced the 'vague, ill-defined fear' he had encountered on his US speaking tour in 1946 to 'hidden feelings of guilt' over the atomic bombardment of the Japanese cities.<sup>11</sup>

## The Atlantic Synthesis in International Relations

International Relations emerged relatively late as an academic discipline and only truly came into its own as an Atlantic synthesis between Wilson's original projection of a global governance to 'make the world safe for democracy' and the

---

<sup>5</sup> Cited in Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light. American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon, 1985, p. 66.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup> Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. with new postscript. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947 [1945], p. 249.

<sup>8</sup> Cited in Brian Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable. Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race*. London: Pluto Press, 1983, p. 121.

<sup>9</sup> Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, op. cit., pp. 4-5, emphasis added; cf. p. 223 on anti-Semitism.

<sup>10</sup> Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., *Mission: Hiroshima* [with C. Stebbins and H. Franken]. New York: Stein & Day 1985 [1978], p. 227.

<sup>11</sup> Cited in Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, op. cit., p. 183.

Nietzsche-Weber-Schmitt legacy of the ‘irrationality of the real’ that German émigré scholars brought with them to the United States in the 1930s. The welding together of these two lineages became the task of the large-scale research infrastructure that had crystallised in the same period in the US and which gave 20<sup>th</sup>-century international thought its specific Anglo-American orientation.

Thinking about foreign relations can be traced to the dawn of humanity, but the modern discipline of IR goes back to the Wilson intervention in Europe at the end of the First World War and to the brain trust mobilised for it, ‘The Inquiry’. Wilson had still entered the war without much concern over its eventual consequences and was known for ‘ma[king] up foreign policy out of his hat’, but with the large land empires of Europe disintegrating and socialist revolution spreading from Russia, the president ‘had grasped the necessity of planning for peace.’<sup>12</sup> The secretary of the Inquiry, Walter Lippmann, on the margins of the Versailles negotiations then worked out a project for an Institute of International Affairs, with Columbia historian James T. Shotwell, J.P. Morgan banker Thomas Lamont, Lionel Curtis, secretary of the Round Table (one of the fronts of the Rhodes-Milner Group, the forward-looking fraction of the British ruling class) and Milner Group international affairs specialist Alfred Zimmern.<sup>13</sup> The Institute failed to materialise in its original, transatlantic format when the mood in the United States turned away from Wilson’s universalism; a Council on Foreign Relations in the US and in Britain, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, under the directorship of Arnold Toynbee) were created separately in the end.<sup>14</sup>

At the time, the single most important Anglo-American network sponsoring scholarly inquiry into foreign affairs was that of Andrew Carnegie. Using the proceeds from the consolidation of his iron and steel interests into US Steel by J.P. Morgan, the Scottish-born Carnegie, a long-time advocate of an arbitration treaty between Britain and the US (eventually concluded in 1911) and of a League of Peace, established the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1905), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), and the Carnegie Corporation (1911). All were dedicated to the propagation and dissemination of knowledge and understanding ‘among the peoples of the United States and the British Dominions and colonies’.<sup>15</sup>

Besides the Anglophile philanthropist himself, the driving force in the Carnegie network was Elihu Root, Secretary of War in two Republican administrations and Secretary of State of Theodore Roosevelt from 1905 to ’09. Root believed that the United States should mobilise science in large-scale structures to overcome the individualism inherent in Lockean liberalism; only thus would the US be able to

---

<sup>12</sup> G. J.A. O’Toole, *Honorable Treachery. A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991, p. 310.

<sup>13</sup> On the Rhodes-Milner Group, see Carroll Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment. From Rhodes to Cliveden*. New York: Books in Focus, 1981 [1949].

<sup>14</sup> Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust. The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 16. E.O. Czempiel’s dating of 30 May 1919 (when the original agreement was reached) as the birthday of IR, cf. Ekkehart Krippendorff, *International Relations as a Social Science*. Brighton: Harvester, 1982 [1975], p.23, overlooks the incubation period that runs to the atomic bombings of Japanese cities.

<sup>15</sup> Cited in Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Golden Donors. A New Anatomy of the Great Foundations*. New York: Dutton, 1985, p. 136. Cf. Ludovic Tournès, ‘La Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale et l’invention de la diplomatie philanthropique’, in Tournès, ed. *L’argent de l’influence. Les fondations américaines et leurs réseaux européens*. Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010, pp. 32-3.

match Germany's war-making capacity on the science front.<sup>16</sup> This was exactly what Lippmann thought was necessary for the social sciences. Fearing, like Root, that provincialism inherent in liberal, self-regulating society would undermine collective effort, Lippmann in a book of 1922 proposed that universities and research institutes be welded together with the State Department, the War Ministry, and other state institutions through a 'central agency'.<sup>17</sup> This would ensure that the social sciences retain a practical policy orientation.

What is at stake here is the transformation of intellectuals into a functional cadre actively connected to the organisation and reproduction of ruling class hegemony. As 'organic intellectuals', their impact no longer depends on eloquence and the external mobilisation of affects and passions, but on closely studying practical life according to generally accepted methods. Their socialised intellectual labour thus is made part of the extended state in their capacity as 'permanent persuaders'.<sup>18</sup> The foundations in turn function as relays imposing the discipline of capital on this vector of state/society relations. International topics were funded from the start, not least because the capital groups from which the foundations were spun off as tax-exempt philanthropies, were themselves transnational concerns.

The Rockefeller Foundation, formally established in 1913 to bring order to the philanthropic excursions of the famous oil magnate, dedicated its subsidies first to the study of new managerial techniques, not to international matters.<sup>19</sup> Yet its medical research and the financing of inoculation campaigns, apparently unrelated to US foreign policy, actually followed the flag into areas of foreign involvement fairly directly. The sanitation campaign in Latin America from 1910 may be seen in connection with yellow fever casualties during the war over Cuba in 1898; the anti-TB campaign was launched when Wilson declared war on Germany and began shipping troops to France.<sup>20</sup> Other major philanthropies, such as the Guggenheim Foundation, spun off from the non-ferrous metals operations of the eponymous family, or the Ford Foundation which would tower over all of them after World War II, also were prominent in subsidising social science and IR in particular.

The closest to a 'central agency' mediating between academic research and the national security-related branches of the state apparatus, as intended by Lippmann, was perhaps the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). It was established in 1923 with key roles played by Beardsley Rummler and political scientist Charles E. Merriam.<sup>21</sup> Rummler was the manager of the Rockefellers' General Education Fund and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, founded in 1918 and re-focused on the social sciences in 1922. Merriam had been a US propaganda officer in Italy during World War I. From his experience in dealing with the threat of revolution he drew the conclusion that politics should be approached as a fluid

---

<sup>16</sup> Dominick Jenkins, *The Final Frontier. America, Science, and Terror*. London: Verso, 2002, p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*. Machine re-edition, n.p.: BNPublishing.com., 2010 [1922], p. 257.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. 'Intellettuali', in *Dizionario Gramsciano 1926-1937* [G. Liguori and P. Voza, eds.]. Roma: Carocci, 2009, p. 427.

<sup>19</sup> Nielsen, *Golden Donors...*, op. cit., p. 84; Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *The Rockefellers. An American Dynasty*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, p. 121.

<sup>20</sup> Ludovic Tournès, 'Introduction. Carnegie, Ford, Soros : Généalogie de la toile philanthropique,' in Tournès, ed. *L'argent de l'influence...*, op. cit., pp. 11-2.

<sup>21</sup> Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 61, 131-4.

process of opinion formation, which a social science driven by ‘method’ could realistically hope to ‘control’.<sup>22</sup>

In the 1930s, this infrastructure—planning groups like the Council on Foreign Relations, the large foundations<sup>23</sup>, the SSRC, and the actual universities—was able to absorb refugees from Nazi Europe as organic intellectuals of the global projection of US power. Many of those finding a safe haven in the United States and keen to demonstrate their loyalty in the struggle against Nazism were also enlisted as propagandists (Gramsci’s ‘permanent persuaders’) and/or intelligence officers in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the post-1947 CIA.<sup>24</sup> As the President of the International Studies Association in 1965, John Gange, later remembered, the OSS ‘was like a big university faculty in many respects—sometimes, staff meetings were just like faculty meetings’.<sup>25</sup>

The most important post-war research body to emerge as a specifically security-related entity was the RAND Corporation (acronym of Research & Development), established in 1945 by the US aerospace industry and the newly expanded Ford Foundation, with active support of the US Air Force. Unlike 1918-‘19, when the widely publicised threat of German airborne poison gas attack could not be mobilised by US military and industrial interests (themselves under fire from the ‘Merchants of Death’ campaign),<sup>26</sup> this time military-industrial demobilisation was effectively prevented. The reason was not a matter of military preparedness in the narrow sense, but the awareness, thoroughly studied by various planning groups during the war, that active overseas involvement by the United States was necessary to facilitate the transnational capital movements on which the economy had come to depend.<sup>27</sup> Military outlays also sustained effective demand from a Keynesian perspective, just as the maintenance of a large defence establishment and overseas military presence in a climate of fear had disciplinary effects on society—at home, across the post-war US-centred alliance system, and beyond.<sup>28</sup>

This suggests that the United States or the West at large, does not ‘have’ a military-industrial complex, but ‘is’ one, as E.P. Thompson famously claimed in the 1980s.<sup>29</sup> Certainly the prominence of economists in the evaluation of what nuclear

---

<sup>22</sup> Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 396; Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, p. v. Merriam after his Italian experience was also active in Chicago city politics for a time.

<sup>23</sup> At this point the Carnegie foundations were the largest of all, with the Rockefeller ones second and the two networks accounting for nearly 60% of all capital in 123 US foundations. Ferdinand Lundberg, *America’s 60 Families*. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1937, pp. 330-2.

<sup>24</sup> Alfons Söllner, ‘Von Staatsrecht zur “political science”? Die Emigration deutscher Wissenschaftler nach 1933, ihr Einfluß auf die Transformation einer Disziplin’, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 31 (4) 1990, p. 645; P. Th. Walther, ‘Zur Kontinuität politikwissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen: Deutschlandstudien exilierten Dozenten’ in G. Göhler and B. Zeuner, eds. *Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1991, pp. 142-3.

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Marshall Windmiller, ‘The New American Mandarins’ in Theodore Roszak, ed. *The Dissenting Academy*. New York: Vintage, 1968, p. 120.

<sup>26</sup> Jenkins, *The Final Frontier*, op. cit, pp. 13-20.

<sup>27</sup> David W. Eakins, ‘Business Planners and America’s Postwar Expansion’ in D. Horowitz, ed. *Corporations and the Cold War*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

<sup>28</sup> Fritz Vilmar, *Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus. Eine sozio-ökonomische Analyse des Militarismus*, rev. ed.. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1973 [1965], pp. 59-60; Mike Davis, ‘Nuclear Imperialism and Extended Deterrence’ in *New Left Review*, eds., *Exterminism and Cold War*. London: Verso, 1982.

<sup>29</sup> E.P. Thompson, ‘Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization’, in *New Left Review*, *Exterminism and Cold War*, op. cit. Thompson also saw the USSR as such a ‘MIC’.

bombs meant for the US world role in 1945-46, points to the involvement of a broader set of interests. The dedicated SSRC committee established right after the nuclear bombings was chaired by Princeton economist W.W. Riefler. With sociologist William Ogburn and Yale University strategist Bernard Brodie among its members, its second report already refocused on civil defence, although only the US had the bomb. Another group, led by Ivy League free trade advocate Jacob Viner (then at the University of California) and the sociologist, Edward Shils, articulated the thesis of nuclear deterrence at a conference in Chicago in 1945. As Kaplan relates, Viner argued that since there was no way an attack could eliminate a state's nuclear arsenal entirely, the remaining retaliatory capability in fact made the atom bomb a weapon of peace.<sup>30</sup> Brodie edited a volume entitled *The Absolute Weapon* elaborating the deterrence argument, with contributions of Arnold Wolfers, W.T.R. Fox, and other luminaries of Yale's Institute of International Studies. He was one of those denouncing nuclear physicists Leo Szilard, Einstein, and others who called for a world government to deal with the nuclear threat; Viner dismissed them as 'hysterical'.<sup>31</sup> As with the response to '9/11', the atmosphere of denunciation and suspicion in 1946-47 left little room for nuanced opinion.

The anti-communist witch-hunt associated with the name of its animator, Senator Joe McCarthy, aimed at disciplining the trade union bloc in the New Deal coalition first of all. But the universities, expanding under the G.I. Bill that gave veterans access to higher education on a large scale, also were drawn along in the wave of patriotic fervour. 150 faculty at the University of California alone were fired in 1949 for refusing to sign an oath of loyalty; in fact, given the role of the large foundations and the particular funding model of US private universities, 'the greatest direct enemy of the Left in the academy was not the coherent policy of the state, but the opportunism and cowardice of boards of trustees and university administrators'.<sup>32</sup>

Few US academics at that point would apply for research funding citing communist sympathies, yet Guggenheim president Henry A. Moe in 1951 formally declared party members ineligible for it.<sup>33</sup> But then, as Lindsley Kimball, vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation, put it in the same year, the threat was all the more terrifying *because* it was invisible. In the past, 'We knew that our enemy was a Spaniard, an Englishman, or a German. We knew where to find him and the beginning and end of his enmity was clearly defined.'

Now our enemy is insidious. He is international. He lives in a twilight zone between war and peace. He invades not only our shores, but our society as well. And he exhibits a protective coloration, and a genius for disguise which make him difficult to combat and leads us to the verge of a national hysteria.<sup>34</sup>

It is hard not to see the similarity between this 'threat assessment' and today's supposed assault by 'terrorism'. A year after Kimball made his call for enhanced

---

<sup>30</sup> Fred M. Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup> Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, op. cit., pp. 43, 104

<sup>32</sup> R.C. Lewontin in André Schiffrin, ed., *The Cold War and the University. Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*. New York: The New Press, 1997, p. 20; most contributions to this volume are autobiographical sketches (except Wallerstein's chapter) and I cite them without separate bibliographical details. Cf. Boyer, op. cit., p. 103.

<sup>33</sup> Cited in Schiffrin, *The Cold War*, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>34</sup> Cited in John Krige, *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006, p. 142.

vigilance, Congress actually initiated an investigation into the foundations themselves. The Select Committee chaired by Representative E. E. Cox, whilst finding that some officers had unwittingly supported communism, concluded however that on the whole the foundation system was supportive of 'the American system of free enterprise'.<sup>35</sup> The Cox committee also noted that suspicion was often aroused because many US citizens associated 'social science' with socialism, and 'international' with un-American activities. This as Lipschutz has argued, has deep roots in the fear of strangers dating from early European settlement and in Puritan notions of 'possession' by evil forces, alien or even extra-terrestrial.<sup>36</sup> Clearly to be an IR scholar under these conditions involved almost superhuman responsibilities, but fortunately powerful interests were in place to provide support.

### IR as Cold War Discipline

The new IR realism downplayed the global governance project originally associated with Wilson without giving up the principle of Western supremacy. To suit the needs of a test of wills with the new contender, the USSR, it built on the theoretical legacy that German intellectual exiles had brought with them across the Atlantic. Of this legacy the thinking of Carl Schmitt was particularly well suited for the nuclear age. Schmitt's central tenet holds that 'sovereignty resides ultimately in that power that can declare and enforce the state of exception, suspending the constitution in an emergency'. It comes into its own in a climate of terror, as 'the politics of the exception [is] transmuted into the politics of fear as a socially integrative device.'<sup>37</sup> To Schmitt, the question who is the 'enemy' is not a matter of differentiation or graded assessment, e.g. in terms of economic rivalry; neither can a general system of norms or, say, an arbiter, rein in conflict were it to occur. The enemy 'is just the other, the foreigner [*der Fremde*], and it suffices for his essence that he is in a particularly intensive sense, existentially, something other and foreign'.<sup>38</sup>

Hence there can be no reasonable expectation of order outside one's own, secure environment, and this ultimately chimes again with the anarchy theorem of Anglo-American international relations. For if from a continental European perspective, the 'real' is irrational (a premise of the subjective idealist ontologies of Nietzsche, Weber and Schmitt),<sup>39</sup> from a Lockean point of view, those without property and by inference, non-capitalist societies, lack rationality because no proper concept of self-interest can be formulated if there is no possession to begin with.<sup>40</sup> Yet in the post-war climate of nuclear terror it was the Schmittian calculus which 'effectively

---

<sup>35</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 140-1.

<sup>36</sup> Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *Cold War Fantasies. Film, Fiction and Foreign Policy*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p. 36.

<sup>37</sup> Benno Teschke, 'Decisions and Indecisions. Political and Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt'. *New Left Review*, Second Series (67) 2011, pp. 72-3.

<sup>38</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963 [1932, 1927], p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> Radhika Desai, 'Fetishizing Phantoms: Carl Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, and "The Political",' in A. Bakan and E. MacDonald, eds. *Critical Political Studies: Debates and Dialogues from the Left*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, p. 394.

<sup>40</sup> This follows the reading of Locke by C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. For the conventional distinction between the two approaches to anarchy, cf. Arnold Wolfers, 'Introduction. Political Theory and International Relations', in Wolfers and Lawrence W. Martin, eds., *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs. Readings From Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, p. xv.

became the determining influence for the entire realist ethic, even though the majority of Anglo-American authors appear to have adopted it indirectly and implicitly, notably through the work of [Hans] Morgenthau.<sup>41</sup>

Morgenthau, a German émigré and chair in IR at Chicago after Merriam's departure, at this juncture enforced Cold War discipline on the field in his critique of E. H. Carr in the first issue of the Princeton IR journal, *World Politics*. Since power in Morgenthau's view is entirely separate from morality (which by default, becomes absolute), there is no need to give any moral credit to our enemies; but neither should we forgo the advantages of our own position. Mocking Carr's claim that the West should make sacrifices so as to avoid war, as it did in Munich, Morgenthau is also scathing of the Briton's judgement that the planned economy is progressive and liberal laissez-faire reactionary; that democracy must include the economy; and that communism has a moral content as well—all this makes Carr a 'Machiavelli without *virtú*', and his *Twenty Years' Crisis* a 'failure'.<sup>42</sup> Thus Carr's foundational IR text was written out of the script to make way for Morgenthau's own, *Politics Among Nations*, in which he argues that every state, irrespective of time and place, is driven by a Nietzschean will to power. In the ensuing struggle for survival, there is no reasonable ground for a global moral order.<sup>43</sup>

The same conclusion was inferred from the premise of human sinfulness by the Protestant theologian and second-generation German immigrant, Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr initially championed global governance (to which the USSR was expected to submit as well) and made a wartime trip to the UK for the Rockefeller Foundation to propagate the idea, only to detect a Soviet design to subjugate the whole of Europe after the war.<sup>44</sup> This earned him an introduction to the Council on Foreign Relations by OSS veteran Allen Dulles and an advisory position with the US State Department. Niebuhr was closely involved in the creation of Americans for Democratic Action, conceived to uncouple the New Deal welfare state commitment of the Democratic Party from an international left outlook that might predispose it to a conciliatory attitude to the USSR; his austerity and obsession with sin made him reject both mass consumption and Lockean liberalism.<sup>45</sup>

The totalitarianism theorem expounded by European exile Hannah Arendt in this climate offered an intellectually sophisticated framework to posit a continuity between Nazism and state socialism as state-led societies.<sup>46</sup> Even if she did not see herself as a Cold Warrior, Arendt's conflation of fascism and Stalinism as both capable of 'radical evil', fitted the needs of the period perfectly.<sup>47</sup> James Burnham's theses on managerialism threatening Lockean possessive individualism, ten years earlier, also highlighted these similarities.<sup>48</sup> But the fear of communism went deeper because it contradicted the foundational liberalism of Anglo-America,

---

<sup>41</sup> Klaus-Gerd Giesen, *L'éthique des relations internationales. Les théories anglo-américaines contemporaines*. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1992, p. 59.

<sup>42</sup> Hans Morgenthau, 'The Political Science of E.H. Carr'. *World Politics*, 1 (1) 1948, pp. 130-1, 134. Cf. Giesen, *L'éthique...*, op. cit. p. 92.

<sup>43</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Knopf, 1967 [1948], p. 10.

<sup>44</sup> Richard W. Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr - a Biography*. New York: Pantheon, 1985, pp. 211- 217.

<sup>45</sup> Richard H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age. American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*. New York: Harper & Row, 1985, p. 109; Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, op. cit., pp. 227-9.

<sup>46</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1966 [1951].

<sup>47</sup> Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture. The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and post-war American hegemony*. London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 43-4.

<sup>48</sup> James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1960 [1941].

whereas there were definite affinities with the anti-communism and to a lesser degree, the anti-Semitism of the Nazis. Niebuhr's conclusion that communism was even more dangerous than Nazism because of its atheism, and Burnham's references to 'Eurasia', which according to Pells aroused profound anxiety because the term was little known at the time, added further grounds for making communism far more alien to the US mindset.<sup>49</sup> The head of policy planning at the State Department, George Kennan, in his famous 'X' article in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947, likewise stressed the 'Asian' roots of the Russian danger. They fuelled what he called a 'particular brand of fanaticism unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise'.<sup>50</sup>

The repressed fears of atomic death (it was by then un-American to claim that the United States had used the bombs for any other purpose than 'to save lives'),<sup>51</sup> via this complex of ideas was projected on the USSR and communism. Especially once the Soviet state obtained its own atomic bomb, which in turn intensified the communist witch-hunt, etc., the idea that somewhere out there were irrational monsters intent on destroying the West, gained credence. The Lockean West led by the United States, as the epitome of freedom-loving rationality, thus faces contender states operating from a different, actually irrational, set of premises; through a medium (international relations) that itself too is devoid of reason. From this perspective the event that had brought the United States into the war, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, could become the paradigm of post-war relations with the nuclear-armed Soviet Union.

The RAND Corporation was at the centre of this belief. Initially focussed on aerospace engineering research, social science too was made part of its remit once the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations honed in. At a conference in New York in 1947, Warren Weaver, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, inaugurated a RAND social science division under German immigrant Hans Speier and an economics one under Charles J. Hitch.<sup>52</sup> Throughout there were close ties with MIT which likewise mutated from being a science and engineering institution into a comprehensive research university. Philip Morse, the technical director of the weapons systems advisory body to the US armed forces established in 1948, after a brief stay at RAND moved to MIT in 1950. There he would later set up the Institute for Defence Analysis. Morse remained a board member at RAND, where he directed the war games simulation program.<sup>53</sup>

The role of the intelligence services in foreign policy analysis was formalized when President Truman in January 1946 authorized the formation of a Central Intelligence Group to coordinate the work of the State Department, the War and Navy Departments, and the OSS, officially disbanded in 1945 but sections of which

---

<sup>49</sup> He also claimed communism was more dangerous because it was *less* heinous, Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, op. cit., p. 229. Pells, *The Liberal Mind...*, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>50</sup> George F. Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' [1947, signed 'X'] reprinted in *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* New York, Mentor, 1951, p. 105.

<sup>51</sup> Today we are all too familiar with this trope. The debate about whether the bombs were dropped to intimidate rather than shorten the war has subsided, whilst the fact that *two* bombs were dropped, engineered by two rival consortia, has never truly become subject of deeper investigation. See James S. Allen, *Atomic Imperialism. The State, Monopoly, and the Bomb*. New York: International Publishers, 1952.

<sup>52</sup> B.L.R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 63.

<sup>53</sup> Krige, *American Hegemony...*, op cit., p. 233.

continued to function.<sup>54</sup> One aspect of the Act was the transfer of the Research and Development Board (which had been working as an intelligence organisation expanding on the work of the Office of Naval Research entrusted with basic science for military purposes) into a new National Military Establishment to be headed by nuclear scientist Vannevar Bush.<sup>55</sup> With the establishment of the Department of Defence and the CIA by the National Security Act of July 1947, the connections with academia were intensified too; after the Korean War, historian William Langer was enlisted by the CIA to set up an Office of National Estimates which operated until the 1970s.<sup>56</sup>

The recruitment of IR scholars into the extended national security state proceeded in various ways. Brodie, one of the Yale Institute for International Studies 'realists', joined RAND in 1951; his Yale colleague, Klaus Knorr, moved to Princeton's Centre for International Studies.<sup>57</sup> There he joined the 'Princeton Consultants', a confidential circle supplying intelligence to Allen Dulles, then head of the CIA. It also included Max Millikan of MIT, scholar-ambassador Robert Bowie of Harvard, Philip E. Mosely (then director of studies of the Council on Foreign Relations), and Hamilton Fish Armstrong (editor of its quarterly journal, *Foreign Affairs*), along with historians and Soviet specialists.<sup>58</sup> Indeed from an intelligence point of view it was only logical that Soviet studies, 'Russia' institutes that is, would be well-funded from the start. The Rockefeller Foundation in 1945 kick-started the Columbia Russia Institute that became the model; it was followed by Carnegie's funding of Harvard's Russian Research Centre, with veteran OSS anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn as director. The RAND Corporation too was an important centre in Soviet studies with luminaries such as Nathan Leites, Merle Fainsod, Raymond Garthoff, Herbert Dinerstein, and others.<sup>59</sup>

In 1954 the Rockefeller Foundation's Kenneth W. Thompson, formerly at Chicago with Morgenthau (they co-authored *Man and Modern Society* of 1953) and the Foundation's link to IR, initiated regular meetings of a committee intended to ensure that the discipline remain functional for policy making. The 'Rockefeller Committee' included Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Wolfers, W.T.R. Fox, Louis Halle, Kenneth Waltz, and State Department policy planning director and investment banker Paul Nitze, the author of the alarmist NSC-68 report of 1950. It did not survive the thawing of the Cold War, but its British offshoot, organised around Herbert Butterfield, did.<sup>60</sup>

The nuclear psychosis that was at the root of McCarthyism, forcing IR into its realist straitjacket, proved an enduring feature of US intellectual life. As Shils was to write, what began as an emergency soon 'established itself as a chronic condition'.<sup>61</sup> The idea of an existential struggle with an evil foe inspired strategic

---

<sup>54</sup> Scott-Smith, *The Politics...*, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>55</sup> Krige, *American Hegemony...*, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>56</sup> Arthur S. Hulnick, 'CIA's Relations with Academia: Symbiosis Not Psychosis', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 1 (4) 1987, p. 42.

<sup>57</sup> W.T.R. Fox, *The American Study of International Relations*. Columbia, S.C.: Institute of International Studies, 1968, p. 54.

<sup>58</sup> John Cavanagh, 'Dulles Papers Reveal CIA Consulting Network. Panel met secretly in Princeton'. *Forerunner*, April 29 1980, p. 2. [www.cia-on-campus.org/princeton.edu/consult.html](http://www.cia-on-campus.org/princeton.edu/consult.html) (accessed 11 February 2010).

<sup>59</sup> Schiffrin, *The Cold War*, op. cit., p. 112; Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies', in Schiffrin, p. 208.

<sup>60</sup> Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society. A History of the English School*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 81, 87 n. 66; *Who's Who in the US, 1964-65*, Chicago: Marquis, 'Thompson'.

<sup>61</sup> Cited in Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, op. cit., p. 101.

thinkers such as Albert Wohlstetter, who joined the RAND economic division as a mathematician in 1951 and who became the godfather of what we know today as the 'NeoCons'. His wife Roberta wrote the classic study about Pearl Harbour, the key metaphor of RAND theorizing from 1945.<sup>62</sup>

The notion of unprovoked surprise attack is a rationalisation of an irrational fear because it suspends the need for explaining why an attack would actually be imminent or likely at all.<sup>63</sup> But then, 'Schmitt's Leviathan is inimical to the mention of purposes, as this would entail a calculus of proportions: no more terror than necessary'.<sup>64</sup> As studies on RAND document extensively, this created a curious mix of elitist self-glorification and fin de siècle decadence. The Wohlstetters especially were cult figures, leading the way in combining apparently emotionless calculations about atomic mega-death and destruction in the spirit of Dr. Strangelove, with a lavish wining and dining lifestyle. They saw themselves as wizards, as borne out by Roberta Wohlstetter's dedication of her book on Pearl Harbour to 'my favourite magician'.<sup>65</sup>

'Rationality' at RAND thus came to mean the quest for survival in the context of uncertainty created by the capacity for total destruction by an evil enemy bent on surprise attack. Given this irrationality and the absence of rational mediating forces, the only way intersecting interests can be described is by resorting to mathematics, in the matrices of game theory. Based on utility-maximising, self-interested 'rational' behaviour, this divorced strategic decisions from moral considerations.<sup>66</sup> Game theory came to RAND via the mathematician John D. Williams, who brought Hungarian immigrant and mathematician John von Neumann into the organisation as a part-time consultant.<sup>67</sup> Neumann pioneered the idea of game theory in a 1928 German journal article and in 1944 published *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* with Oskar Morgenstern. He introduced his game theory 'as an adjunct to [military operations research], lending mathematical firepower and intellectual clout to the wartime concern over "strategy": it was he who forged the lasting links with the computer as tool and as exemplar for organizational rationalization'.<sup>68</sup> Neumann had worked for the Manhattan Project as a computer analyst and had no qualms about using nuclear weapons. At Los Alamos he was known for his extreme ideas about destroying the Soviet Union as early as possible.<sup>69</sup> Edward Teller in 1953 included Neumann on the so-called 'Teapot Committee' to study the

---

<sup>62</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision*. [Foreword Th. C. Schelling]. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Albert Wohlstetter's classic piece is 'The Delicate Balance of Terror' of 1959, reprinted as 'Choosing Policies for Deterrence', chapter 18 of Ch. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Atheneum, 1974.

<sup>63</sup> Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites: Narratives of Fear and the Global Political Economy of Danger'. *Global Society*, 13 (4) 1999, p. 429.

<sup>64</sup> G. Weiler cited in Desai, 'Fetishizing Phantoms...', op. cit., p. 397.

<sup>65</sup> Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, op. cit., pp. 122-3; Easlea, *Fathering...*, op. cit.; Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor...*, op. cit., dedication.

<sup>66</sup> Anatol Rapoport, 'Systemic and Strategic Conflict. What Happens When People Do Not Think—and When They Do' in R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz, eds. *Toward a Theory of War Prevention*. vol. 1 of *The Strategy of World Order*. New York: World Law Fund, 1966 [1964], pp. 261-4. From the start, this was also extended into other areas of social behaviour: it was RAND economist Kenneth J. Arrow who applied the notion of rational choice in his *Social Choice and Individual Values* of 1951.

<sup>67</sup> Smith, *RAND Corporation*, op. cit., p. 283 note.

<sup>68</sup> Krige, *American Hegemony...*, op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>69</sup> Easlea, *Fathering...*, op. cit., p. 120.

possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, a major step in raising the stakes in the arms race from which so far, no way back has been found.<sup>70</sup>

### **The War on Terror as Global Discipline**

Let me now turn to the second transformation in which IR as a discipline of fear ensured a continuity between different, incomparable international challenges to Western supremacy. In the early 1970s, the West was on the defensive against an unprecedented combination of contending forces. Soviet nuclear parity (the cost of which to the USSR would only become evident much later), a Third World coalition clamouring for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and using the UN General Assembly to press its cause, and a wide array of national liberation movements challenging Portuguese colonialism, Zionism, the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, and US-supported dictatorships in Central America, all in their own way constrained the projection of Western global governance. Internally, the states of the Lockean heartland faced the consequences of the student and workers' movement which was contained only with difficulty, by extending class compromise domestically and internationally.

Certainly the US defeat in Vietnam in 1975, coming on the heels of Richard Nixon's removal over Watergate, triggered a series of investigations and reorganisations that promised to reorder the links between academia and US foreign policy. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Senator Frank Church reported in 1976 that academics collaborating with the CIA 'are located in over 100 American colleges, universities and related institutes'.<sup>71</sup> Given that the behavioural prescriptions of US social scientists recruited into the war effort as 'new mandarins'<sup>72</sup> had so obviously proved wrong, and the public mood turned against foreign intervention, US and allied intelligence services were very much left to themselves in dealing with the rise of the Left. In the process they relied on covert branches of the 'deep state' such as the NATO stay-behind groups in Europe that after the collapse of the USSR would become known by their Italian name, *Gladio*.<sup>73</sup>

In Greece, a NATO-supported coup in 1967 installed a brutal military regime under Georgios Papadopoulos, a former Nazi and section head of Greek intelligence, KYP, working closely with the CIA and US corporations; in Allende's Chile, targeted assassinations such as that of the loyal head of the military, René Schneider, paved the way for the 1973 Pinochet coup.<sup>74</sup> This 'strategy of tension', in which terrorist violence is used to disrupt a Left advance judged unstoppable by parliamentary means and preparing the ground for a coup, was spelled out in a 1970 US Army document signed by General William Westmoreland, US commander in Vietnam and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The document, Supplement

---

<sup>70</sup> Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, op. cit., p. 63-4.

<sup>71</sup> Cited in Konrad Ege, 'Rutgers University: Intelligence Goes to College'. *CounterSpy*, June – August 1984, pp. 42-44. [www.cia-on-campus.org/rutgers.edu/ege.html](http://www.cia-on-campus.org/rutgers.edu/ege.html). (pp. 1-7). (Accessed 1 Feb. 2010, p. 4.

<sup>72</sup> Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969 [1967].

<sup>73</sup> Leo A. Müller, *Gladio—das Erbe des Kalten Krieges*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991; Daniele Ganser, 'Fear as a Weapon. The Effects of Psychological Warfare on Domestic and International Politics'. *World Affairs*, 9 (4) (Winter 2005) pp. 28-44.

<sup>74</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq*. London: Pluto Press, 2006, pp. 141, 184.

B to US Army Field Manual 30-31, dated 18 March 1970, recommends penetration of violent insurgent groups by US intelligence to propel them into action in cases where 'Host Governments' and the public are deemed insufficiently alert to the communist threat.<sup>75</sup>

The Field Manual was first heard of when a Turkish newspaper in 1973 announced its publication in light of a wave of unexplained violence, but the journalist in possession of it disappeared, never to be heard of again. Only in 1976, a Turkish army colonel took the risk of publishing a translation, also revealing the existence of a secret NATO underground in the country.<sup>76</sup> With the document surfacing in the Spanish and Italian press as well, the US Congress continued to investigate this aspect of foreign involvement. The Pike Report to the US House of Representatives, like its Senate counterpart established to investigate the role of the CIA in the late 1960s and early 70s, concluded that 'US foreign policy lacked a long-term direction and ... the government ... often resorted to covert action by the CIA as a short-term solution to problems that really required long-term remedies.'<sup>77</sup> Neither the Church nor the Pike Committees in the end were able to cleanse the US state security apparatus of these covert branches—these obviously are an essential part of the global imperial pyramid of power that will hold its own bar a revolutionary transformation.

From the experience of the 1970s, it would seem that the 'deep state' uses of terror broadly fall into two categories: 'manipulation' and 'false flag'. In both cases, there is a clearly identified main enemy which has a mass base that is not itself inclined to violence (1970s Communism, popular movements for national self-determination, Islam...). Paradoxically, this non-violent mass basis is the problem: FM 30-31B actually considered the Left threat at its most acute when it 'renounce[s] the use of force'.<sup>78</sup> The manipulation route, then, entails the penetration of a fringe group which is authentic, but inclined to violence, hoping to expand its following by appealing to the main cause. The extent to which the group is then provoked or manipulated into actual violence, varies; it can also take action itself, but with the foreknowledge of the organisms of the deep state which are supposed to have it under surveillance. The 'false flag' tactic is more simple. Here the relevant agency of the deep state, or rogue elements in it, launch an undercover attack directly, implicating the fringe group by various means.

When it seemed that the Italian Communist Party was moving closer to government power, adjusting its policies under the 'Historic Compromise' with Christian Democracy to avoid a Chilean scenario, the strategy of tension reached its tragic heights.<sup>79</sup> The Moro abduction in 1978, it would seem, was an instance of manipulation (of the Red Brigades); the deadly bombing of the Bologna railway station two years later was certainly a false flag operation. It was later found to be the work of neo-fascists and by several steps led to the disclosures revealing the

---

<sup>75</sup> Excerpts in Philip Willan, *Puppet Masters. The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy*. London: Constable, 1991, pp. 209-11. An internet search for 'FM 30-31B' gets one straight to the facsimile.

<sup>76</sup> Ganser, 'Fear as a Weapon', op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>77</sup> Willan, *Puppet Masters...*, op. cit., p. 114. The House voted not to release the Pike Report but the text was leaked and published by *The Village Voice*, 16 February, 1976.

<sup>78</sup> Ganser, 'Fear as a Weapon', op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>79</sup> Willan, *Puppet Masters...*, op. cit.; Cf. Enrico Berlinguer, 'Gedanken zu Italien nach den Ereignissen in Chile' [trans. from *Rinascita*, 28 September 1973] in P. Valenza, ed. *Der historische Kompromiss*. Hamburg: VSA 1976.

existence of the NATO stay-behind structure, *Gladio*.<sup>80</sup> At the time, Italian analysts highlighted the Schmittian logic of the state of emergency; a population will rally to its government even when disaffected with it, as long as ‘terror’ is depicted as *absolute evil* and not approached realistically and proportionally.<sup>81</sup>

### The Blueprint for a Global ‘War on Terror’

The idea of mobilising the terror scare in international relations surfaced in a series of conferences in the run-up to the US Presidential election of November 1980 that would bring Reagan to power. The first, held in Jerusalem in July 1979 under the auspices of the Jonathan Institute (named after Benjamin Netanyahu’s brother killed in the Entebbe raid on a hijacked Israeli passenger jet), discussed the topic of Soviet support for international terrorism. It was attended by US Senator Henry Jackson, George H.W. Bush (Sr., former CIA director and then still a Republican presidential hopeful looking for a cause), and defence intellectuals such as Yonah Alexander of the State University of New York and Ray Cline, CIA deputy director from 1962 to ’66 and Professor of IR at Georgetown University. Identifying ‘Moscow’ as the hub of ‘international terrorism’ aimed at creating a continuity between the Cold War complex with its associations of nuclear surprise attack, and the terrorism of fringe groups. Redefining national liberation as terrorism followed the Israeli example—like all occupying forces in modern history it uses this label to de-legitimise armed resistance whilst using extralegal repression and excessive violence itself, a model followed increasingly by others.<sup>82</sup>

The 1979 conference’s key theses were that a ‘war on terror’ had to be waged through pre-emptive attacks on states supporting terrorism; that a dedicated intelligence infrastructure be established; and that civil liberties should be rolled back for those suspected of terrorism and possibilities for preventive detention without charge, as well as for torture, be widened. Simultaneously the ‘terrorists’ should be dehumanized in the eyes of the public.<sup>83</sup> At the conference, Bush pleaded for ‘drastic surgery as the only reasonable course—[i.e.] determined action, firmness under the duress of blackmail, and swift and effective retribution’. He conceded though that it would not be easy to convince an open society that these measures were needed—indeed ‘the legitimate exercise of state power’ might be frustrated by the liberal conscience of ‘the open society’.<sup>84</sup>

A follow-up conference in Washington in April 1980 ‘under expanded auspices’ also featured Henry Kissinger, Richard Pipes, and a host of neoconservatives from the US.<sup>85</sup> Bush had to settle for the vice-presidency under Ronald Reagan, who won

---

<sup>80</sup> Ganser, ‘Fear as a Weapon’, op. cit., pp. 34-5. Tamir Bar-On and Howard Goldstein, ‘Fighting Violence: A Critique of the War On Terrorism’. *International Politics*, 42 (2) 2005, p. 229.

<sup>81</sup> Gianfranco Sanguinetti, *Over het terrorisme en de staat* [trans. from the French]. Bussum: Wereldvenster, 1982 [1979], pp. 53-5.

<sup>82</sup> Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Israel’s Role in the Third World: Exporting West Bank expertise’, *Race & Class* 26 (3) 1985, pp. 9-30.

<sup>83</sup> Diana Ralph, ‘Islamophobia and the “War on Terror”’: The Continuing Pretext for U.S. Imperial Conquest’, in Paul Zarembka, ed. *The Hidden History of 9-11*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008 [2006], p. 265.

<sup>84</sup> Bush cited in Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Bob Callahan, ‘The 1980 Campaign: Agents for Bush’, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 33, 1990, p. 5. Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 23, does not mention Bush as a participant in the Jerusalem conference but the others do and his speech is in the conference proceedings, cf. Ralph, ‘Islamophobia...’, op. cit., p. 285.

the election later that year on a campaign extolling the threats to the US, dramatised by the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, and pledging to bolster the defences against it. I need not recount here how Reagan's election team under William Casey (later CIA director) secretly arranged with the occupiers of the embassy that they would sustain the occupation until after the election, on the promise of US spare parts for the Islamic Republic's armed forces, an agreement that laid the foundations for the subsequent Iran-Contra scandal. The image of the occupied US embassy evoked deep fears of darker-skinned, bearded young men with small arms, compounding the fear of nuclear attack on the Kremlin's orders. In the period leading up to the election, researchers found that especially among frequent TV viewers, the 'pervasive cultivation of mistrust, apprehension, danger, and exaggerated "mean world" perceptions' had created a public 'mainstreamed' by a culture of fear, in the US more than anywhere else.<sup>86</sup>

Reagan's first Secretary of State, Vietnam veteran and former NATO commander Alexander Haig, Jr, in a State Department Current Policy document gave the new narrative the official stamp of approval when he characterised terrorism as the greatest threat to world peace on account of its reliance on Moscow, the global nerve-centre. Basing himself on the proofs of Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*, supposedly exposing a world-wide terror operation managed by the KGB, Haig sought to deny legitimacy to national liberation movements by re-baptising them 'terrorists', just as he dismissed the concept of a 'Third World'.<sup>87</sup> As we can see today, these apparently semantic shifts represent a profound ideological reorientation which would make the 'war on terror' possible; never mind that the 'centre' in Moscow was on its last legs. Haig's views were echoed by another Reagan appointee, UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who highlighted the confusion 'between force used to liberate and force used to enslave', leaving 'a majority of nations in the UN [to] regard legitimacy as a function of the will and power exercised on behalf of "national liberation movements"'.<sup>88</sup>

In 1981 Israel demonstrated how the strategy of 'going after terrorists' would work when it attacked Palestinian targets in Lebanon. It did so in retaliation for an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London by the Palestinian Abu Nidal group, a terrorist cell penetrated by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, and which actually had no presence in Lebanon. When PLO forces shelled Israeli West Bank settlements to retaliate for the attack on Palestinians in Lebanon, Israel had the pretext to invade Lebanon with regular land forces, initiating an occupation of South Lebanon that would last until 2000.<sup>89</sup> Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander in fact based their 1984 book, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, on PLO materials captured by the Israeli army in its incursion into Lebanon to support the claim that Palestinian resistance to occupation was directed from Moscow.<sup>90</sup> In a study for the

---

<sup>86</sup> George Gerbner, Larry Gross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorelli, 'The "Mainstreaming" of America: Violence Profile No. 11'. *Journal of Communication*, 30 (3) 1980, pp. 18, 25 & passim.

<sup>87</sup> Sterling's analyses were dismissed by the intelligence services as fiction, Jürgen Roth and Bernd Ender, *Dunkelmänner der Macht. Politische Geheimzirkel und organisiertes Verbrechen* Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv Verlag, 1984, p. 14-15, 37-8.

<sup>88</sup> Jeane Kirkpatrick in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism. How the West Can Win*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986, p. 59. These proceedings of the Washington D.C. Jonathan Institute conference on international terrorism, held in 1984, have many short contributions which I have not cited separately in extenso.

<sup>89</sup> Ralph, 'Islamophobia...', op. cit., pp. 265-6.

<sup>90</sup> Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*. New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1986 [1984].

US Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, *State-Sponsored Terrorism*, they documented that the term 'national liberation' was Soviet propaganda, not a difficult task of course.

Cline and Alexander then launched a *Terrorism* book series (edited by Cline) and a journal, *Political Communication and Persuasion*, edited by Alexander (who had his own Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at SUNY). The editorial board of the journal included Leonard Binder (UCLA), James N. Rosenau (Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California), as well as representatives of the Heritage Foundation and RAND. On the advisory board were Samuel Huntington of Harvard, Seymour Martin Lipset, former government officers such as Helmut Sonnenfeldt, then at the Brookings Institution, as well as Lord Chalfont and journalist George F. Will.<sup>91</sup> In 1984 the Moon Sect of South Korea set up an 'International Security Council' through their front organisation, CAUSA. Authors of its pamphlet series included William R. Van Cleave of UCLA; Eugene D. Rostow of Yale; Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor-in-chief of the *Washington Times* (launched by Moon as a counterweight to the liberal press in the US), as well as assorted generals and admirals.<sup>92</sup>

The programme for a global war on terror as we know it today was spelled out in June 1984 at another Jonathan Institute conference, also in Washington DC. Its participants included George W. Schultz, US Secretary of State after Haig's ouster, US Attorney General Ed Meese, FBI Director William Webster, Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, journalists Claire Sterling, De Borchgrave, George Will and Bob Woodward, and scholars such as Bernard Lewis of Princeton, Michael Ledeen of Georgetown, Eugene Rostow, and many others. It called for 'a broad-based, vigorous campaign against the terrorists and their sponsors'. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's UN ambassador at the time, convener of the conference and editor of the papers, defined the 'two main antagonists of democracy in the postwar world', communist totalitarianism and Islamic radicalism, as together constituting a 'worldwide network of terror'. What was needed in the West was a 'realignment of attitudes'. Marxism and Islam according to Netanyahu had combined in giving terrorism its impetus, and the United Nations had justified it by calling terrorism a struggle for national liberation.<sup>93</sup>

The collected papers, published a year after Gorbachev had taken over to preside over the capitulation in the arms race with the West, are almost surrealistic in their glowing depiction of imminent enslavement at the hands of the USSR. Today we may read with amazement Netanyahu Sr.'s assessment that 'there can be no doubt about the Soviets' motive. Terrorism is the first general attack upon a free society which the enemies of freedom plan to take over'; or George Will's warning against 'denying the undeniable—the fact that we are under assault from the Soviet Union'.<sup>94</sup> Yet the statements are relevant because they document how a conscious

---

<sup>91</sup> *Political Communication and Persuasion. An International Journal*. Leaflet from the publisher, Crane Russak & Co. The journal began in 1983.

<sup>92</sup> The ISC in a pamphlet of 1986 proposed among other things 'to insure that terrorist group operations are not financed by dollar and other hard currency accounts held in European banks', and deny passage to known terrorists if need by publicly embarrassing allies, as was done to French President Mitterrand to force him to take action in stopping the Libyan involvement in Chad. See *International Security Council, State-Sponsored Terrorism and the Threat to International Security*. New York: CAUSA International, 1986, pp. 13-4.

<sup>93</sup> Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., pp. 3, xi, 12.

<sup>94</sup> Benzion Netanyahu in Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., p. 29; George F. Will in *Ibid.*, p. 29.

effort was made to carry over the rollback strategy against the USSR to a new age of preventive counterrevolution and global control.

The three main lines of the strategy formulated at the 1984 conference were, first, the idea of a forward defence against terrorism; secondly, the rejection of any investigation into the possible motives of terrorists; and finally, the need for a Pearl Harbour-like event to shock people out of their complacency.

As to the first, renegade Labourite Paul Johnson and NeoCon stalwart Eugene Rostow both praised the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as setting an example for terrorists worldwide. It sent a message to ‘the master killers of Tehran and Tripoli’ (Johnson), whilst Rostow claimed that intervention should be recognised as a right.<sup>95</sup> George Shultz identified a ‘League of Terror’ composed of Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, recommending that if intelligence warrants it, pre-emptive attack should be an option. For as Republican senator Paul Laxalt put it, ‘if we learned that Libya or Iran had obtained ... a nuclear weapon, would we really be obliged to wait until that weapon was used?’<sup>96</sup>

As to the second issue, John O’Sullivan, deputy editor of the *Times*, favourably compared the way the tabloids publicise only the horrors of an outrage, with the tendency of the quality press to try and explain the causes of terror (which he claimed works *for* the terrorists). TV moderator Ted Koppel however expressed confidence that once a war had been declared (which Johnson had failed to do in Vietnam), ‘then all kinds of societal pressures, and indeed legal pressures, [would] come to bear on the media to play a different role from the one they play right now’.<sup>97</sup> Invoking a security emergency indeed reduces the space for democratic deliberation, or even suspends it altogether.<sup>98</sup> So what sort of emergency can achieve this?

This was the third theme covered at the 1984 conference, outlined by Netanyahu himself. Violence, he argued, was already so endemic in the international system that people’s sensibilities had been numbed. However,

Terrorism follows an inexorable, built-in escalation. To be effective, it must continually horrify and stupefy. Yet once we have become accustomed to a particular level of violence, *a new outrage is required to shock our sensibilities*. It used to be enough for terrorists to hijack a plane to attract international attention; next it became necessary to kill a few hostages; in the future, more violence will be required.<sup>99</sup>

Only if there would be one mighty blow, and then ‘a successful war on terrorism... not just erratic responses to individual terrorist acts’, the United States would be able to build ‘an anti-terrorist alliance ... with two or three or possibly more countries.’ This group would be in a position to ‘credibly threaten the offenders, and [it] alone can impel the neutrals to shed their neutrality’. Then the ‘citizens in a democracy’, united in fear and seeing themselves as ‘soldiers in a

---

<sup>95</sup> Paul Johnson and Eugene Rostow in Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., pp. 36-7 and 148, respectively.

<sup>96</sup> George Shultz and Paul Laxalt in Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., pp. 16 and 187, respectively.

<sup>97</sup> John O’Sullivan and Ted Koppel in Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., pp. 235 and 239, respectively (in the plenary discussion).

<sup>98</sup> Stefan Elbe, *Virus Alert. Security, Governmentality, and the AIDS Pandemic*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p. 91.

<sup>99</sup> in Netanyahu, ed. *Terrorism...*, op. cit., p. 218, emphasis added.

common battle', would be 'prepared to endure sacrifice and even... immeasurable pain'.<sup>100</sup>

The means of disarming the USSR were obviously of a different nature than the Contra offensive on three continents enshrined in the Reagan Doctrine of 1986. Both projects mobilised a broad array of academic specialists; congressional investigations had not in the end cut the links between the national security state and academia, and the Iranian revolution and US intelligence failures according to many even required their being upgraded. When President Carter in 1979 commissioned an outside review of the CIA, one of the three members of the committee was IR scholar Klaus Knorr, a member of the Princeton Consultants, whilst Carter's CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, appointed Robert Bowie, another of the Princeton Consultants, to head a new Foreign Assessment Centre.<sup>101</sup> Two hundred and fifty universities and colleges had Pentagon contracts in 1980-81, with MIT and Johns Hopkins accounting for half of them. Biological warfare and its implications were studied at University of Maryland, weather modification at Berkeley, global governance at the University of Illinois, and so on.<sup>102</sup> The CIA under Casey ratcheted up funding for research on liberation movements ('terrorists') such as the New People's Army in the Philippines, although in 1981 all twelve Africa Studies centres in the US declined the offer of hundreds of thousands of dollars by the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA, the Pentagon counterpart of the CIA) to provide intelligence.<sup>103</sup>

Still under Carter, the NATO decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles on European soil, aimed at Soviet command centres, greatly exacerbated relations with the USSR. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later in the year, which Carter's National Security adviser and Columbia IR scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski famously boasted was a trap he had set up for them, the new arms race under Reagan proved too much for the Soviet Union to sustain. Academic experts were involved in this final offensive in various ways, such as gathering intelligence through the European Non-State Actors Project (ENSAP) about the protest movement in Europe against the NATO missile deployment. In 1986 the author was a participant at a conference on 'Interdependence and Conflict', one in a series organised by James Rosenau, with ENSAP investigator and Rutgers University IR chair Richard Mansbach among the participants. In 1984, Mansbach and a Rutgers colleague had been admonished by their school officials for depositing students' papers in a CIA-funded research project without their knowledge.<sup>104</sup>

The disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR two years later removed the supposed centre from the international terrorist network. In his 'end of history' thesis, Francis Fukuyama, a RAND scholar and former State Department planning staff official, did not dwell much on terrorism. Certainly the residual 'societies mired in history' on the periphery remained a 'realm of struggle, war, injustice, and poverty', but they were not so much a threat as an outlet for the Nietzschean personality type bored by the best of all worlds achieved in the United

---

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., pp. 225-6

<sup>101</sup> Cavanagh, 'Dulles Papers...', op. cit., p. 7

<sup>102</sup> Hulnick, 'CIA's Relations with Academia...', op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>103</sup> Ege, 'Rutgers University...', op. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 6, cf. p. 2. Both Rosenau and Mansbach also participated in a sequel conference held a year later in Yugoslavia. Cf. James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp, eds. *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1989.

States.<sup>105</sup> Indeed by the end of the decade, the Reagan Doctrine Contra offensives in Central America, Angola and Mozambique, and Afghanistan had also been largely successful, albeit at unspeakable human costs and unforeseen long-term consequences. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis revived the terrorism theme. This crucial intervention restored the link (the 'Confucian-Islamic connection') between the ascendant contender state, China, and transnational Third World revolt (national liberation-turned-terrorism), for which population growth in Muslim countries supposedly provided the cohorts.<sup>106</sup>

Taking Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation as a case in point, Huntington also highlighted the aspect of weapons of mass destruction ending up in the 'wrong hands'. With the possibility of a large-scale demobilisation of the Cold War national security infrastructure looming large, this not only identified a new set of existential challenges to the West. It also ensured the continuity with the fear of nuclear war launched by the Kremlin, except that this time, not the functioning but the defunct USSR was at the origin of the threat—as its military assets might fall into (again) the 'wrong hands'.

Huntington wrote his article as Director of the John M. Olin Centre for Strategic Studies at Harvard; his book, like Fukuyama's, acknowledges the support of the Olin foundation, spun off from the eponymous chemicals and munitions maker to 'funnel desperately needed funds to scholars, social scientists, writers, and journalists who understand the relationship between political and economic liberty'.<sup>107</sup> This relationship obviously requires a continuous mobilization of military might, which from now on was being justified by the terror threat in combination with nuclear proliferation. In 1995, President Clinton issued a Presidential Directive that gave priority to preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, whilst John Deutch, then CIA director, testified the following year that terrorists would attack US information systems, prompting Senator Sam Nunn to speak of an 'electronic Pearl Harbour'.<sup>108</sup>

In 1998, Deutch returned to the terror threat in an article in *Foreign Affairs* co-authored with former Assistant Secretary of Defence Ashton B. Carter of Harvard and University of Virginia IR scholar Philip D. Zelikow, a close associate and co-author of Condoleezza Rice.<sup>109</sup> In the article the authors speculate on an impending 'transforming event' that would, 'like Pearl Harbour, ... divide our past and future into a before and after', taking the World Trade Centre bombing attempt of 1993 as their example. Had that event succeeded, the authors claim,

---

<sup>105</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992, p. 318; cf. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, pp. 3-18.

<sup>106</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London: Touchstone Books, 1998, p. 103 & passim; cf. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (3) 1993, pp. 22-49.

<sup>107</sup> Statement by former Republican statesman William P. Simon, president of the John M. Olin Foundation, cited in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn. The Decline of the Democratic Party and the Future of American Politics*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1986, p. 87. Olin, formerly Olin Mathieson, is still a munitions and explosives maker. Its Winchester subsidiary website has an electronic targeting device to improve one's shooting.

<sup>108</sup> Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites...', op. cit., pp. 427, 420.

<sup>109</sup> Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow 'Catastrophic Terrorism. Tackling the New Danger'. *Foreign Affairs*, 77 (6) 1998, pp. 80-94. Cf. Condoleezza Rice and Philip D. Zelikow, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1995.

The resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America's fundamental sense of security... The United States might respond with draconian measures, scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and use of deadly force.<sup>110</sup>

Whilst not the first time that the idea of a catastrophic attack on the US homeland was raised in *Foreign Affairs*,<sup>111</sup> the Carter-Deutch-Zelikow piece is especially important in light of its authors' key policy roles prior to and post-9/11, especially Zelikow's. In 1999 he produced a paper for the University of Virginia's Miller Centre in which he analyses how the thrust of politics is directed by 'public myths', which rest on a 'moulding event'. Such events create 'generational public presumptions ... that become etched in the minds of those who live through them.' Not that they need not be 'true'; what matters are beliefs '*thought to be true*' (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty). However, they must be 'shared in common within the relevant political community'; here discipline is mandatory.<sup>112</sup>

Carter, Deutch and Zelikow were also participants in the high-level Aspen Strategy Group directed by Robert Zoellick (which Zelikow took over after Zoellick, currently World Bank president, accepted a government post) and volunteering advice for the incoming president in a series of edited collections. Since Zelikow would be on the Bush II transition team, working closely with Rice, the recommendations are important even though the new president still had to be elected.

Among the dangers facing the US, Ashton Carter in one Aspen document edited by Zelikow speaks of 'catastrophic terrorism of unprecedented scope and intensity ... on U.S. territory,' in addition to the rise of China and other threats. Future opponents would avoid symmetrical confrontations with the US and rather bring 'destruction to the U.S. homeland through catastrophic terrorism.'<sup>113</sup> A separate memorandum, also included in the Zelikow collection, and prefaced by Deutch, dealt with the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' that would have to replace the deployment of Cold War style military power. Diplomacy would have to be adjusted to this 'RMA' because, as one retired admiral put it, 'overseas base access is essential to any significant use of force by the United States', given that 'without ready access to overseas basing', a modernised military force would not be deployable in time in the required locations. Substituting 'force surges for continual forward presence', this would also affect alliance, i.e., NATO strategy, because what had to be ensured was the ability 'to quickly reduce the ambiguity of violent situations, to respond flexibly, and to use force, where necessary, with precision and accuracy'.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, 'Catastrophic Terrorism', op. cit., p. 81

<sup>111</sup> Earlier in 1998 Richard Betts of Princeton had warned that a 'radical Islamic group' might launch a biological attack, or that otherwise 'enemies' 'might attempt to punish the United States by triggering catastrophes in American cities'. Cited in Lipschutz, 'Terror in the Suites...', op. cit., p. 423.

<sup>112</sup> Cited in Bryan Sacks, 'Making History: The Compromised 9-11 Commission', in Zarembka, ed., *The Hidden History of 9-11*, op. cit., p. 223.

<sup>113</sup> Ashton Carter in Philip D. Zelikow, ed., *American Military Strategy. Memos to a President*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001, pp. 37-8, 41.

<sup>114</sup> William Owens in *Ibid.*, p. 137.

It would seem that the Jonathan Institute approach of hot pursuit, with its implication of pre-emptive attack on states harbouring terrorists, is the underlying assumption here. Indeed as a senior RAND official put it in the Aspen papers, unless the US would retreat from its global interests, especially from East and Southwest Asia, it should deny powers in those regions acquiring nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction and ‘not exclude pre-emptive conventional strikes during crisis’.<sup>115</sup> Clearly everything now depended on the ‘new Pearl Harbour’ that had been called for ever since the 1984 Jonathan Institute conference in Washington and which among others had been repeated as a necessary precondition for a ‘New American Century’ by the eponymous Project, several members of which (notably Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld) joined the Bush Jr. administration in key positions.

9/11 then finally did bring the new Pearl Harbour. As an event it broadly fits the strategy of tension model: whether it was a matter of authentic perpetrators being manipulated, or a false flag operation, still awaits further disclosures. The official explanation however is unacceptable on straightforward factual grounds.<sup>116</sup> Everything that followed fits into prior projections of what such a disaster would entail by way of US response. Zelikow became executive director of the 9/11 Commission that was to provide the official explanation for what was certainly a ‘moulding event’ imposing a new discipline of fear and determining the course of policy for the ensuing decades.

#### Academic IR and the New Wars

Throughout the neoliberal counterrevolution associated with the names of Thatcher and Reagan, apparently more detached and academic theoretical revisions in mainstream IR had been in evidence as well. Kenneth Waltz’s return to a neo-realist paradigm shorn of all social references would be a case in point.<sup>117</sup> But as with the earlier Cold War, realism never entailed abandoning the claim to Western pre-eminence, an aspiration this time articulated by regime theory. Using the language and logic of David Easton’s systems approach, regime theory provides a new, neutral vocabulary to refer to liberal-capitalist global governance. Thus in the 1980s Stephen Krasner of Stanford became the spokesman of the thesis that the global political economy includes a dimension of governance against which no legitimate claim to sovereign equality can be upheld.

In *Structural Conflict. The Third World against Global Liberalism* of 1985, Krasner argued that the NIEO coalition had challenged liberal capitalism not with straightforward socialism, but on the terrain of international politics itself—which it then sought to build on to transform the global political economy in ways incompatible with liberal capitalism. Krasner calls capitalism the ‘market-oriented’ regime, in which ‘allocation of resources is determined by the endowments and preferences of individual actors who have the right to alienate their property.’<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> David C. Gompert in *Ibid.*, p. 167.

<sup>116</sup> Among the serious demystifications of 9/11, see Zarembka, ed., *The Hidden History of 9-11*, op. cit., and Ian Henshall and Rowland Morgan, *9-11 Revealed. Challenging the Facts Behind the War on Terror*. London: Robinson, 2005. As important in this case are various video documentaries providing visual evidence, compiled from contemporary newsreels, of the damage to the Pentagon and the collapses of the Twin Towers and WTC 7.

<sup>117</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

<sup>118</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict. The Third World Against Global Liberalism* Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1985, p. 5.

The alternative, a contender model in which a state class mobilises its society from above, is the international regime that he calls, again in Eastonian terms, ‘authoritative allocation’. Krasner then outlines how sovereign equality in the NIEO episode was mobilised against global governance as defined by the West. ‘The South has been able to take two legacies of the North—the organization of political units into sovereign states and the structure of existing international organizations—and use them to disrupt, if not replace market-oriented regimes over a wide range of issues’.<sup>119</sup>

In the years that followed, Krasner elaborated the idea that sovereignty in the hands of lesser powers must in one way or another be restricted, challenging the concept itself in *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* of 1999 and *Problematic Sovereignty* two years later. In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion and the replacement of Colin Powell by Condoleezza Rice, Krasner became Bush’s policy planning director at the State Department.

Iraq fits into a series of US-led military interventions beginning with the NATO attacks on Serbia in 1994 and 1999, the invasion of Afghanistan, air operations in Somalia, Yemen, and the NATO war against Libya. All these interventions can be understood as wars of dispossession—of sovereignty judged illegitimate, and of state-owned assets wanted by transnational capital. With other, more recent operations such as the deployment of US special forces in Uganda, this has created what a US newspaper comment has called ‘the American era of endless war’.<sup>120</sup> Reporting from a military base in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the writer notes how the idea from the wars against Japan and Nazi Germany, that at some point they would be over, has been abandoned.

In previous decades, the military and the American public viewed war as an aberration and peace as the norm. Today, radical religious ideologies, new technologies and cheap, powerful weapons have catapulted the world into “a period of persistent conflict,” according to the Pentagon’s last major assessment of global security. “No one should harbour the illusion that the developed world can win this conflict in the near future.”

Highlighting how the military as a result of endless war are beginning to lose touch with civilian society, the author notes how ‘The endless conflict...has triggered major changes in the way Americans view war and peace.’ ‘Peace... has faded from any debate in Washington surrounding the wars... [It] has become something of a dirty word in Washington foreign-policy circles.’<sup>121</sup>

This is perhaps best understood in light of a Western-designed global governance seeking to subdue sovereign equality upheld against it with violent means. In 2005, when he assumed his responsibilities at the State Department, Krasner proposed to formalise the submission to the West of a client governing class as ‘shared sovereignty’, a ‘voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities and an external actor such as another state or a regional or international organization’, if need be ‘limited to specific issue areas like monetary policy or the

---

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>120</sup> Greg Jaffe, ‘A decade after the 9/11 attacks, Americans live in an era of endless war’, *The Washington Post*, 4 September 2011.

<sup>121</sup> The video game, ‘Call of Duty’, disseminates (to the more than 30 million people a year who play it) an understanding of conflict as a never-ending combat that is particularly grisly, but also all around us. The moral of the tale is that victory is unattainable. Ibid.

management of oil revenues'.<sup>122</sup> For post-conflict countries invaded by the West such as Afghanistan and Iraq, shared sovereignty might help in overcoming the limits of governance aid (which the Bush administration in 2004 planned to double in two years). The late Ottoman Empire according to Krasner provides an example of such shared sovereignty in handling debt service, just as West German rearmament in NATO in the 1950s or the prosecution of war crimes in Sierra Leone jointly with the UN are more recent examples.<sup>123</sup>

Building on this Brezhnev Doctrine for imperial global governance, Krasner with former US ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual, holding the new post of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department, actually drew up a list of countries liable to collapse in conflict and hence candidates for shared sovereignty. As Pascual explained in a talk, it was envisaged to write 'pre-completed contracts to rebuild countries that *are not yet broken*'. His office's mandate, he explained, was 'to create democratic and market-oriented' states, which would not always be a matter of rebuilding states from conflict, but '*tearing apart the old*'.<sup>124</sup> In *Foreign Affairs* Krasner and Pascual explained that to identify candidates for such operations, the CIA and the military, think tanks and universities would have to provide the information. Basically the authors propose that 'US or other military or peacekeeping operations' fit into a contingency planning in which the causes of internal conflict are well known in advance, so that over the longer term 'the United States will have enabled more people to enjoy the benefits of peace, democracy, and market economies.'<sup>125</sup>

In 2009, reflecting on the granting of sovereignty to Kosovo by the main NATO states the year before and South Ossetia's recognition by Russia, Krasner further specified his view of sovereignty. Taking a future Palestine as a case in point, he explains that Israel will never allow a sovereign Palestine to exist without some oversight of security, by itself or a third party, under what he calls a 'nested security arrangement'. Again Krasner reiterates his point that 'The international environment is too complex for any set of rules, including those regarding sovereignty, to be applied rigidly across all cases.'<sup>126</sup>

Under Obama, the practices accompanying the increasingly violent observance of Western supremacy over 'failed states'—a concept meanwhile current in the discipline—have become perhaps less self-confident, but not fundamentally different. Referring to the 'endless wars' the West and NATO are now engaged in, Krasner's successor as planning director at the Hillary Clinton State Department, IR scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter, has confirmed that 'In this world we will not "win wars"—we will have an assortment of civilian and military tools to increase our chances of turning looming bad outcomes into good—or at least better—outcomes.'<sup>127</sup>

This has led, over a period punctured but not started by 9/11, to a renewed mobilisation of the guilt and fear complex that followed the dropping of the atom

---

<sup>122</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, 'The Case for Shared Sovereignty'. *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (1) 2005, p. 70.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>124</sup> Cited in William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden. Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 238. Emphasis added.

<sup>125</sup> Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, 'Addressing State Failure'. *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (4) . 2005, pp. 156-7, 162-3.

<sup>126</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, 'Who Gets a State, and Why? The Relative Rules of Sovereignty.' *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, 2009. (<http://www.foreignaffairs.com>) (Accessed 12 July 2011).

<sup>127</sup> Cited in Jaffe, 'A decade after the 9/11 attacks...'. op. cit.

bombs on Japan. The vast military build-up including the continuing upgrade of the US nuclear arsenal, with Britain's Trident in the pipeline, both in breach of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, may be largely invisible to the public.<sup>128</sup> The Anglo-American and NATO interventions however are visible and their high-pitched justifications may not always convince, on the contrary.

One aspect of the new security threat interventions that certainly elicits disquiet is the projection of global justice, the idea that one is already an outlaw by the very appeal to sovereign equality. Not only is the justice meted out through the International Criminal Court, the Yugoslavia Tribunal and other dedicated courts prejudiced against those resisting Western pre-eminence. Those considered dispensable have been dealt with summarily too. From the fall of Afghanistan, when the last secular ruler, Najibullah, and his fellows were hanged from lampposts with their genitals stuffed in their mouths, via Milosevic who was left to die in his cell,<sup>129</sup> to Saddam Hussein who was hanged amidst jeers of his Shiite hangmen, filmed and broadcast the world over, no dignity has been granted to those defeated in the West's wars without end.

Muammar Gaddafi, found hiding from a NATO air attack on his convoy, was lynched in front of cameras. Two weeks earlier Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had paid an unexpected visit to Libya demanding that he be captured or killed. When this happened on 21 October 2011, she was seen joking to a group of officials, 'we came, we saw, he died' (as shown on *Russia Today* the same day). Yet NATO's actions over Libya, involving some 30,000 sorties destroying the country's infrastructure and public buildings and without which the ragtag army of tribal fighters would have made little headway, were in obvious breach of the mandate of the UN Security Council's resolution 1973 to 'protect civilians', paralysing the Council for the foreseeable future. All this has not made the world any safer. To quote the *Washington Post* again,

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Americans were willing to bear almost any price for their security. One lesson of today's endless war seems to be that Americans will have to learn to live with a certain amount of insecurity and fear.<sup>130</sup>

In the United States, 9/11 opened the floodgates of the security culture conveyed by the Long Island University Security Management Institute prospectus I opened this paper with. Among other things this has resulted in a climate of conformity that is reminiscent of the earlier communist witch-hunt, and compared to the McCarthy era, even more tightly drawn.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>128</sup> Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nuclear powers plan weapons spending spree, report finds. US to spend £700bn in next decade while Russia and Pakistan among those assigning role to weapons beyond deterrence'. *The Guardian*, 30 October 2011.

<sup>129</sup> In January 2006, medicine aggravating a heart condition was detected in Milosevic's blood, and Dutch newspapers reported on 'errors' in his medicine regime in previous years. He died a few days after the central plank of the prosecution, that he had led a criminal organisation aiming to create a Greater Serbia, had been dropped whilst evidence compromising the NATO intervention was growing. See N.M.P. Steijnen, 'Het tribunaal had een motief voor Milosevic' dood', *De anti-fascist*, May 2006, pp. 3-5, 20-23.

<sup>130</sup> Jaffe, 'A decade after the 9/11 attacks...'. op. cit.

<sup>131</sup> The percentage of respondents affirming that 'people feel as free to say what they think as they used to' in 2005 was 42.4 per cent, against 55.6 in 1954 (and 52.6 in 1987); the control question inquiring about 'not feeling as free', got 45.7 percent of affirmative answers against 30.7 in 1954 (and 39.4 in 1987). James L. Gibson, 'Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52 (1) 2008, p. 99.

In Europe, the response to the terror scare was muted in comparison and the readiness to adopt the perspective of endless war more hesitant. Robert Cooper, an assistant to Javier Solana, the NATO secretary-general turned EU security and foreign policy representative, in 2003 still challenged the identification of Third World emancipation with terrorism, noting that ‘a century of emancipation, of national liberation movements and self-determination cannot be reversed.’ In his view, ‘market reform’ and ‘good governance’ can be spread without resorting to violence.<sup>132</sup> The combined Anglo-American invasion of Iraq earlier in the year, motivated by fraudulent claims concerning that country’s links to terrorism, was the obvious reference.

In European academia, however, the terror scare has been taken up more enthusiastically, helped by career and funding opportunities alike. The securitisation of IR here has become a trend as well. By way of conclusion let me give a few examples from British universities, which in the 1950s refused to cooperate with the McCarthyist witch-hunt, but this time volunteered to join the crusade.<sup>133</sup>

In 2003, Bristol University’s Politics Department became involved in a Ministry of Defence project on ‘Potential Generic Adversaries 2003-2033’ amongst a range of defence-related activities.<sup>134</sup> In 2004, the CIA launched a \$4 million pilot project to place trainees in UK anthropology departments under the PRISP programme, funding students on the condition they sign up for intelligence work after their degree and take military intelligence summer courses.<sup>135</sup> In May 2008, in what began as a overblown surveillance operation, a graduate student and an employee of the University of Nottingham upon downloading open-source documents deemed security-sensitive, were arrested at the instigation of the university management and held under the Terrorism Act 2000 for six days in what the Home Office at one point even called ‘a major Islamist plot’, before the case collapsed.

Nottingham IR scholar Rod Thornton then presented a paper on this episode at the conference of the British International Studies Association in Manchester, April 2011, only to find himself suspended by his university and made incommunicado by having his e-mail closed down. BISA duly removed Thornton’s paper from its website and rather than protesting Nottingham’s breach of academic freedom or civil rights offered the university its ‘good offices’ in case it were to undertake a review of the matter.<sup>136</sup>

At the University of Sussex, finally, the appointment of the NATO Planning Director Jamie Shea as a visiting lecturer for three years in 2010 (his title was later changed to ‘visiting practitioner’) leads us back to the Long Island University Homeland Security Management Institute. Its board member, Dr Joanne Wright, a security specialist with a background in Northern Ireland, joined the Sussex management in 2006 and it was at her insistence that the IR Department made a switch to an enhanced security profile, for which new money was made available and the presence of Shea was judged an asset. This appointment, which the Department failed to reverse after it was made public, highlights the incorporation

---

<sup>132</sup> *The Guardian*, 23 October 2003.

<sup>133</sup> Krige, *American Hegemony...*, op. cit., passim.

<sup>134</sup> Anna Stavrianakis, ‘Call to Arms: The University as a Site of Militarised Capitalism and a Site of Struggle’. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 35 (1) 2006, p. 143.

<sup>135</sup> Phil Baty, ‘CIA outrages UK academics by planting spies in classroom’. *Times Higher Education*, 3 June 2005, accessed 11 February 2010. Cf. Giroux, *University in Chains*, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

<sup>136</sup> ‘Brief Summary of BISA’s Responses to the Matter at the University of Nottingham’, <http://www.bis.ac.uk/index.php?option=com>, (accessed 24 October 2011).

of research and teaching into the machinery of ‘endless war’. As two Sussex graduate students write, ‘it is not unreasonable to infer that this focus on the university world is part of a conscious policy designed to give [NATO] a greater academic profile and orientate research to its policy concerns.’<sup>137</sup>

This was underscored when Sussex anthropologists in late 2010 were being approached by NATO to volunteer as ‘subject matter expert’ to help develop a new ‘Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats.’ This was exposed by one of the anthropologists invited, just as there was vociferous protest against the coming of Shea to Sussex, and will continue to be. What is at issue here is what Jef Huysmans calls ‘a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust’.<sup>138</sup>

IR scholars and students must reflect on whether this is an approach they subscribe to—or resist it.

---

<sup>137</sup> Luke Cooper and Maïa Pal, ‘Lectures from a Spin Doctor: a Nato strategist’s position at a top British university’. *Open Democracy* 30 June 2011. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/luke-cooper-and-ma%C3%AF-pal>. (accessed 12 September 2011).

<sup>138</sup> Cited in Elbe, *Virus Alert...*, op. cit., pp. 90-1.